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Chapter	1	
Introduction	
	Small	to	medium	enterprises	(SMEs)	in	South	Africa	constitute	57%	of	GDP	and	are	responsible	for	56%	of	all	employment,	making	them	important	features	of	the	economy	and	individuals’	livelihoods.1	Their	sizeable	impact	led	to	the	creation	of	the	Department	of	Small	Business	Development	(DSBD),	which	was	unveiled	by	former	president	Jacob	Zuma	in	2014.	The	DSBD’s	mandate	is	to	support	SME	entrepreneurs	create	jobs,	mobilize	skilled	labor,	and	spur	technological	advancement.	Its	founding	statement	reads:		The	 Ministry	 of	 Small	 Business	 Development	 was	 established	 in	 2014	marking	 a	turning	 point	 in	 history	 of	 [small,	 medium,	 and	 micro-enterprises]	 SMME’s	 and	cooperatives	 development	 in	 South	 Africa,	 demonstrating	 Government’s	commitment	to	place	SMME’s	and	cooperatives	at	the	center	of	economic	growth	and	job	creation.2			SME	entrepreneurship	can	indeed	engender	higher	employment	and	innovation	rates	as	their	work	spans	across	formal	and	informal	sectors	to	provide	goods,	services,	and	employment	to	numerous	segments	of	the	population.		Centering	SME	entrepreneurship	as	a	driver	of	economic	growth	in	the	way	the	DSDB	does	aligns	with	the	neoliberal	theory	of	development	in	how	it	extends	the	function	of	private	sector	entrepreneurs	into	the	domain	of	development.	Since	its	emergence	in	the	mid-1970s,	neoliberal	theory’s	dominance	in	development	policy	has	significantly	reconfigured	the	global	economic	system	and	the	economies	of	individual	states.	Within	the	neoliberal	framework,	the	most	efficient	organization	of	the	economy	is	accomplished	
                                                
1 Department of Small Business Development, “Small Business is Big Business”; Muriithi, "African Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMES) Contributions, Challenges and Solutions", 36-48.  
2  Ibid.  
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through	free	markets	and	free	trade;	accordingly,	the	private	sector—not	the	state—should	drive	the	productivity	of	the	market.3	The	theory	names	the	reduced	role	of	the	state	in	the	economy	and	social	sector	as	a	central	tenet.4	Neoliberal	theory	subsequently	devolves	the	economic	growth	and	development	functions	relinquished	by	the	state	to	corporations	and	businesses	in	the	private	sector.5	These	businesses,	which	are	legally	considered	individuals,	are	free	to	commodify	the	social	security	functions	they	assume	from	the	state,	and	thus	profit	off	of	them.6	Private	schools,	healthcare	centers,	and	water	and	electricity	utilities	are	examples	of	this.		Large	domestic	and	multinational	corporations	often	have	sufficient	productive	assets	to	exploit	the	vacuum	left	by	the	state,	but	SMEs	also	play	a	critical	role	in	this	regard.	This	research	investigates	how	domestic	SMEs’	business	models	are	designed	to	help	the	poor	navigate	the	circumstances	of	economic	and	social	insecurity	neoliberalism	engenders,	while	also	being	proponents	of	the	neoliberal	project	by	capitalizing	on	the	vacuum	left	by	the	state.	This	paper	argues	that	SMEs	play	a	contradictory	role	within	South	Africa’s	neoliberal	economic	landscape	given	that	they	benefit	from	neoliberalism	but	also	mitigate	some	of	the	economic	insecurities	it	engenders	for	the	poor	segments	that	serve	as	clients,	employees,	or	service	providers.		The	inspiration	for	this	research	stemmed	from	the	ubiquity	of	discourse	about	innovative	South	African	and	other	African	entrepreneurs	exercising	their	agency	and	displaying	their	ingenuity	to	creatively	address	problems	like	unemployment,	unaffordable	banking,	or	low	literacy	in	their	communities.	The	discourse	often	excluded	context	about	
                                                
 
4 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 87, 100, 114. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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how	the	conditions	these	entrepreneurs	were	solving	came	to	be,	which	raised	questions	of	the	sustainability	of	relying	on	an	independent	and	private	entrepreneurial	class	to	tackle	fundamental	development	challenges.	South	Africa	is	used	as	the	site	of	analysis	to	investigate	how	the	adoption	and	proliferation	of	neoliberalism	contributed	to	the	nation’s	high	poverty,	unemployment	rate,	food	insecurity,	and	inequality	levels.7		In	addition	to	the	introduction	and	the	conclusion,	which	constitute	Chapters	1	and	5,	there	are	three	substantial	chapters	in	this	thesis.	Chapter	2	provides	a	theoretical	background	on	the	tenets	of	neoliberalism	relevant	to	SME	entrepreneurship.	Specifically,	the	synergy	between	the	principles	of	the	state	playing	a	reduced	role	in	the	economy	and	the	accompanying	privatization	of	social	welfare	functions	is	explored.		Chapter	3	grounds	the	analysis	within	South	Africa’s	geography	and	political	economy	to	offer	historical	perspective	on	what	gave	rise	to	the	adoption	of	neoliberalism	in	the	country.	The	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	opted	to	keep	the	mineral	and	energy	exports	based	economy	intact	by	protecting	the	interests	of	apartheid-era	mineral	and	energy	conglomerate	capital.	8	This	was	at	the	expense	of	the	ANC’s	liberation	era	platform	of	reconstruction	and	redistribution.9	Following	this,	the	economy	was	subject	to	structural	adjustment	conditions	accompanying	a	loan	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	as	well	as	the	shift	to	the	neoliberal	Growth,	Employment,	and	Redistribution	(GEAR)	program.	The	consequences	therein	have	wreaked	havoc	amongst	the	country’s	working	class,	who	still	navigate	circumstances	of	extreme	economic	insecurity	in	which	55.5%	of	
                                                
7 Statistics South Africa, “Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 
2006 & 2015”. 
8 Bond, "Why South Africa Should Undo Mandela's Economic Deals". 
9 Adelzadeh, "From the RDP to GEAR”, 67. 
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South	Africans	are	below	the	national	poverty	line,	26.6%	of	working	age	adults	are	unemployed,	and	24.6%	are	food	insecure.10		Chapter	4	examines	in	depth	the	business	models	of	four	SME	firms	to	assess	how	SME	entrepreneurs	operate	in	their	contradictory	roles	within	neoliberalism	and	the	consequences	in	South	Africa.	The	research	finds	that	SME	entrepreneurs	benefit	from	the	neoliberal	organization	of	the	South	African	economy	as	it	allows	them	to	take	advantage	of	tenets	like	flexible	labor	markets,	raise	capital	from	overseas,	and	profit	from	the	provision	of	social	security	functions	people	cannot	obtain	for	free	or	cheaply	from	the	state.	Conversely,	SMEs	help	the	poor	by	offering	social	security	provisions	in	the	form	of	providing	employment,	streamlining	informal	savings	systems,	developing	software	for	primary	education,	and	financing	other	firms.		
A	Note	on	Methodology	
	 The	case	studies	span	the	personal	finance,	household	services,	and	education	sectors	for	variety	but	are	by	no	means	meant	to	be	a	representative	or	generalizable	sample.	The	objective	is	to	extract	insights,	using	detailed	examples,	on	how	South	African	SMEs	build	their	business	models	around	managing	their	contradictory	roles	within	the	broader	neoliberal	political	economy	of	South	Africa.	The	study	employed	a	mixed	methodology	approach.	Qualitative	data	was	obtained	through	in	depth,	semi-structured	interviews	conducted	in	person	or	by	telephone	with	the	profiled	entrepreneurs.	The	
                                                
10 Statistics South Africa, “Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of Absolute Poverty Between 
2006 & 2015”. 
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interview	questions	centered	around	the	opportunities	and	challenges	that	each	firm’s	business	model	was	built	around.	Primary	documents	from	the	ANC’s	online	archives	were	used	to	inform	the	analysis	of	South	Africa’s	historical	and	geographical	context,	and	a	range	of	secondary	sources	and	media	outlets	was	also	consulted.	
 Below	is	a	full	list	of	the	profiled	entrepreneurs	and	their	companies.	
 
 
Company 
 
Location 
 
Sector 
 
Product 
Clock 
Education 
Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
Education Open source curriculum 
management software 
engineering 
StokFella Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
Savings and 
Investments 
Informal savings vehicles 
for the underbanked 
SweepSouth Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, Durban, 
South Africa 
Consumer 
services 
On-demand domestic 
cleaning services 
	Chapter	5	concludes	the	research	by	contending	that	there	are	tensions	within	the	contradictory	nature	of	the	work	of	SMEs.	SMEs	leverage	neoliberal	constructs	like	flexible	labor	markets	and	relaxed	regulation	surrounding	capital	flows	to	launch,	run,	and	scale	their	businesses,	even	though	some	simultaneously	cater	to	the	needs	of	the	poor.	The	case	
 9 
studies	examined	also	reveal	that	in	addition	to	navigating	these	tensions,	structural	inefficiencies	detract	from	the	capacity	of	SMEs	to	pursue	both	profit	and	social	welfare	objectives.	Thus,	the	onus	for	development	is	devolved	to	an	entrepreneurial	class	that	does	not	have	access	to	the	all	the	necessary	inputs.		A	democratically	elected	government	remains	the	primary	agent	of	people-centered	development	whose	agency	is	simultaneously	constricted	by	the	constraints	of	the	global	economic	system	it	forms	a	part	of.	The	destabilization	of	the	state’s	agency	in	this	way	has	left	the	poor	vulnerable	to	environments	of	economic	and	social	insecurity.	SMEs	play	a	developmentally	paradoxical	role	in	this	setting	and	operate	outside	of	the	scope	of	democratic	accountability,	11		thereby	limiting	their	legitimacy	as	sustainable	agents	of	development.	
	 	
                                                
11 Democratic accountability refers to being formally liable to citizens to be socially responsible, morally 
just, and undertake social welfare as a mandatory objective. Wettstein, "Multinational Corporations and 
Global Justice: Human Rights Obligations of a Quasi- Governmental Institution", 8-16. 
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Chapter	2	
Neoliberalism	and	Development		
Neoliberalism	and	Development	in	the	Global	South	
	 In	1973,	the	proliferation	of	the	Organization	of	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries’	excess	petrodollars	through	Wall	Street’s	investment	banks	presented	the	US	with	the	opportunity	to	offer	high-interest	loans	to	poorer	countries.12	When	Mexico	was	the	first	of	many	countries	to	unexpectedly	default,	the	global	balance	of	payments	was	disrupted	and	the	stability	of	entire	financial	system	was	compromised.13	In	response	to	this,	the	International	Monetary	Fund	was	repurposed	to	ensure	that	countries	in	the	global	South	repay	their	loans.14	According	to	neoliberal	theory,	this	was	to	happen	if	the	global	South’s	economies	were	restructured,	liberalized,	and	deregulated.15	In	this	framework,	economic	growth	would	come	through	lowering	or	eliminating	barriers	to	free	trade;	privatizing	state-owned	industries	and	utilities;	and	making	labor	markets	flexible	and	have	less	protection	for	workers.16	Most	significantly	to	this	study,	the	state	should	voluntarily	reduce	its	interference	in	the	economy	and	social	sector	and	the	private	sector	should	take	over	as	the	engine	for	economic	growth.17	
                                                
12 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 28. 
13 Gibbon, "The World Bank and African Poverty, 1973–91", 197-198. 
14 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 12. 
15 Rist, The History of Development, 24-36. 
16 For insights on SAPs, post-Washington Consensus growth, and neoliberalism in Africa, see Thandika 
Mkandawire, Joseph Mensah, Eunice Sahle, and Iboe Hutchful’s contributions. 
17  Rist, The History of Development, 24-36. 
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Neoliberalism’s	expansion	to	African	states	took	place	primarily	through	terms	and	conditions	attached	to	funding	from	the	international	financial	institutions	(IFIs).18	This	was	highly	successful	in	the	1980s,	when	38	African	governments	entered	into	244	loan	agreements	with	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF.19	By	the	1990s,	IMF	deals	were	still	active	in	36	countries,	which	is	more	than	70%	and	65%	of	the	continent	each	decade.20	Financial	assistance	from	IFIs	carried	conditions	of	economic	policy	reform	in	the	form	of	Structural	Adjustment	Programs	(SAPs).21	SAPs	were	designed	to	facilitate	developing	countries’	adoption	of	neoliberalism	in	order	to	expand	the	practice’s	influence	as	the	dominant	global	economic	system.	SAPs	prescribed	market	primacy	as	foundational	to	economic	growth,	defined	by	increasing	gross	domestic	product	(GDP).	Subsequently,	growth	is	meant	to	engender	economic	development,	which	refers	to	the	distribution	of	GDP	and	an	improvement	in	the	quality	of	life	of	citizens.22			
The	Privatization	of	Development		 		 Within	neoliberalism,	the	vacuums	left	the	by	withdrawn	state	are	meant	to	be	filled	by	the	private	sector,	whose	role	is	to	undertake	economic	development	and	social	welfare.	David	Harvey	delineates:		Neoliberalism	 is	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 a	 theory	 of	 political	 economic	 practices	 that	proposes	 that	 human	 well-being	 can	 best	 be	 advanced	 by	 liberating	 individual	
                                                
18 Ncube and Lufumpa, The Emerging Middle Class in Africa, 37-38. The other IFIs are the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organization. 
19 Ossome, "In Search of the State? Neoliberalism and the Labor Question for Pan-African Feminism", 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Meyer, Masehla and Kot, "The Relationship Between Economic Growth and Economic Development: A 
Regional Assessment in South Africa", 1377-1382. 
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entrepreneurial	freedoms	and	skills	within	an	institutional	framework	characterized	by	strong	private	property	rights,	free	markets,	and	free	trade.	The	role	of	the	state	is	to	create	and	preserve	an	institutional	framework	appropriate	to	such	practices.23		
	
Entrepreneurship	as	a	Neoliberal	Silver	Bullet			 Adhering	to	the	ideological	separation	of	the	state’s	role	in	the	economy	and	the	well-being	of	its	citizens	leads	to	reduced	spending	on	social	welfare	provisions	like	healthcare,	education,	and	utilities.	Subsequently,	the	private	sector	fills	the	vacuum	left	by	the	state	and	profits	from	the	commodification	of	these	goods	and	services.	One	example	of	this	is	the	how	the	South	African	national	electricity	utility	and	roads	agency	were	converted	from	state-owned	enterprises	(SOE)	to	parastatals.24	In	other	instances,	private	firms	take	over	entire	welfare	functions	by	running	private	hospitals	or	schools.		Economic	and	social	insecurity	can	spur	individuals	and	communities	to	seek	out	ways	to	remedy	their	circumstances	outside	of	ineffectual	states	and	large,	private	companies.	Liberal	individualism,	which	exalts	one’s	autonomy	to	pursue	their	own	well-being	is	a	central	component	of	this	neoliberal	theory	of	development.25	Entrepreneurship	in	this	context	can	be	opportunity-based	or	survivalist.	26	The	tale	of	the	innovative	African	who	made	a	solar	lamp/water	pump/radio	from	virtually	nothing	before	distributing	the	innovation	throughout	his	region	is	idealized	in	ways	that	neglect	the	material	insecurity	
                                                
23 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2. 
24 Gentle, "Escom to Eskom: From Racial Keynesian Capitalism to Neoliberalism (1910-1994)", 51. 
25 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 64. 
26 Opportunity entrepreneurship occurs when people start businesses to exploit a need in the market for 
which they think they can offer a unique, profitable solution. Approximately 44% of African entrepreneurs 
fall into this category. Survival entrepreneurship occurs when people start businesses because they 
struggle to make a living by finding employment elsewhere. Approximately 33% of African entrepreneurs 
fall into this category. African Development Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the United Nations Development Program, "African Economic Outlook (AEO)". 
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that	necessitated	the	ingenuity.	Entrepreneurship	in	development	forms	part	of	the	effort	to	rebrand	the	free	market	as	an	inclusive	one	and	privatizing	the	onus	of	societal	welfare.27	This	extreme	devolution	names	self-determination	and	ingenuity	as	the	new	determining	factors	for	upward	mobility	and	increased	economic	agency	for	the	poor.	Dolan	and	Rajak	capture	it	well	in	writing:	“Autonomy,	ingenuity,	self-mastery,	homegrown	innovation	and	freedom	from	the	dependence	of	aid	and	welfare	are	just	some	of	the	moral	and	social	goods	that	this	discourse	of	new	entrepreneurship	in	development	lays	claim	to	as	both	the	driver	and	product.”28		The	continent	boasts	the	world’s	greatest	proportion	of	adults	(22%)	starting	new	businesses.29	Between	3%	and	60%	of	GDP	and	up	to	90%	of	employment	can	be	attributed	to	formal	and	informal	SMEs	across	Africa.30	In	South	Africa,	SMEs	constitute	57%	of	GDP	and	are	responsible	for	56%	of	all	employment.31	A	quick	Google	search	of	“Africa”	and	“entrepreneurship”	can	leave	one	feeling	rather	optimistic.	The	African	Development	Bank’s	(AfDB)	African	Economic	Outlook	report	names	entrepreneurship	as	the	cornerstone	of	the	continent’s	industrialization	agenda,	the	priority	for	the	next	decade	of	economic	development.32	Moreover,	articles	and	reports	with	titles	like	“Why	Entrepreneurship	is	Booming	in	Africa”	by	the	Harvard	Business	Review,33	“Why	Africa’s	
                                                
27 Dolan and Rajak, "Remaking Africa’s Informal Economies: Youth, Entrepreneurship and the Promise of 
Inclusion at the Bottom of the Pyramid", 514. 
28 Ibid., 515. 
29 African Development Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United 
Nations Development Program, "African Economic Outlook (AEO)". 
30 Muriithi, "African Small and Medium Enterprises (SMES) Contributions, Challenges and Solutions", 44-
48. 
31 Department of Small Business Development, “Small Business is Big Business”. 
32 African Development Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United 
Nations Development Program, "African Economic Outlook (AEO)". 
33 Ekekwe, "Why African Entrepreneurship Is Booming". 
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Young	People	Should	Turn	to	Entrepreneurship”	by	the	World	Economic	Forum,34	and	“Africa	Looks	to	Its	Entrepreneurs”	by	the	United	Nations’	Africa	Renewal	Magazine35	have	become	ubiquitous	following	the	collapse	of	the	2000	-	2015	“Africa	Rising”	commodity	boom.	
	
In	Support	of	Entrepreneurship’s	Role	in	Economic	Growth	
	 SMEs,	in	the	contemporary	African	development	context,	operate	primarily	at	the	base	of	the	pyramid	(BOP)	where	most	Africans	are	in	terms	of	income	and	purchasing	power.	Business	at	the	BOP	(BBOP)	includes	for-profit	enterprises	that	engage	the	world’s	approximately	four	billion	lowest	earners	as	employees,	service	providers,	or	consumers.36	The	BBOP	framework	is	a	highly-lauded	alternative	to	reliance	on	the	public	sector	and	foreign	aid	as	drivers	of	economic	growth	and	development	for	this	population.	BBOP	rejects	one-size-fits-all	business	models	and	instead	embraces	tailor-made	formatting	that	suits	the	BOP’s	consumption	patterns.	Examples	of	localized	problem	solving	by	entrepreneurs	include	innovations	such	as	pay-as-you-go,	mobile-first	technology,	and	off-grid	solar.		Entrepreneurs,	both	opportunity	and	survivalist,	have	an	acute	understanding	of	the	need	for	these	specialized	business	models	and	the	advantage	of	being	closer	to	the	issues	than	many	governments,	larger	companies,	or	foreign	multinationals.	For	both	types,	innovation	begins	with	identifying	a	challenge.	Designing	and	selling	the	solution	is	the	backbone	of	building	a	scalable	enterprise.	Many	startups	in	Africa	address	issues	that	fall	
                                                
34 Bonnici, "Why Africa’s Young People Should Turn to Entrepreneurship". 
35 Obonyo, "Africa Looks to Its Entrepreneurs". 
36 Rangan, Chu, and Petkoski, "The Globe: Segmenting the Base of the Pyramid". 
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into	one	of	two	categories.	The	first	is	lowering	barriers	to	access/reducing	friction	in	people’s	lives	by	streamlining	and	reducing	the	cost	of	processes	like	paying	for	energy	or	water.	The	second	is	increasing	the	volume	and	variety	of	options	people	have	to	add	value	to	their	lives	such	as	obtain	gainful	employment,	learn	new	skills,	or	purchase	a	product	or	service.			
The	Advantage	of	Specialized,	Profitable	Solutions	
	 SMEs	–	technology-enabled	startups,	specifically	–	place	great	importance	on	highly-tailored	solutions.	Countless	feedback	loops	are	utilized	in	market	research,	product	design,	and	service	delivery.	Thus,	businesses	become	hands-on,	context-driven,	and	sensitive	and	adaptive	to	end	users’	needs.	These	business	models	are	built	from	barebones	structures	often	called	minimum	viable	products	(MVPs).37	MVPs	are	released	to	end	users	to	test	and	evaluate	using	various	experimental	techniques.	In	A/B	testing,	randomized	groups	of	end	users	are	offered	slightly	different	versions	of	the	product	or	service	to	evaluate	which	is	more	useful	as	measured	by	customer	acquisition	or	repeat	use	rates.38	Another	technique	is	price	elasticity	testing	using	coupons	with	varying	discounts.39	The	coupon	redemption	rates	at	each	discount	amount	are	analyzed	to	gauge	the	price	point	at	which	the	consumers	believe	a	product	offers	value	for	money.		Other	methods	include	target	audience	focus	groups	and	referral	and	group-purchase	discounts.40	All	resultant	
                                                
37 York and Danes, "Customer Development, Innovation, And Decision-Making Biases in the Lean 
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38 Pandor, interview by author, July, 2016. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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data	is	analyzed	to	decipher	end	user	needs,	preferences,	and	purchasing	power.	Products	and	services	are	then	further	tailored	based	on	these	outcomes,	resulting	in	highly	specialized	customer	profiles	that	equip	the	startup	to	cater	to	consumers	across	various	socioeconomic	and	geographic	contexts.41	Finding	and	exploiting	the	ideal	consumer-product	fit	enable	startups	to	scale-up	and	become	financially	successful.42	Understanding	the	patterns	of	diverse	consumer	segments	on	the	continent	has	powerful	implications.	First,	how	people	spend	their	money,	particularly	at	the	BOP	where	resources	are	limited,	indicates	their	needs	and	values.	Second,	parsing	the	consumption	patterns	of	various	groups	can	shed	light	on	the	current	state	of	resource	distribution	in	any	given	geography.	For	example,	if	people	in	a	particular	area	or	of	a	particular	age	are	disproportionately	turning	to	the	private	sector	for	a	certain	good	or	service,	this	indicates	it	is	not	being	adequately	provided	by	the	public	sector.	Third,	Africa	remains	a	data-poor	landscape	in	many	ways.	Thus,	any	understanding	of	how	differences	across	gender,	class,	or	geography	affects	demand	for	goods	and	services	is	generative.			
Self-Sufficiency	through	Wage	Labor	as	Welfare		
	
	 In	the	neoliberal	tradition,	entrepreneurship	provides	job	creation	as	a	means	to	economic	development.	Increasing	the	proportion	of	wage	earners	excuses	the	state	from	having	to	extend	wealth	redistribution	initiatives	like	cash	transfers	to	the	poor	or	free	or	subsidized	education,	housing,	and	healthcare.	The	onus	thus	devolves	to	individuals	to	
                                                
41 York and Danes, "Customer Development, Innovation, And Decision-Making Biases in the Lean 
Startup", 25-26 
42 Ibid. 
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seek	out	these	essential	services	for	themselves,	which	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	everyone	has	the	same	capability	to	undertake	this	in	the	absence	of	an	social	security	safety	the	part	of	the	state.43	In	the	neoliberal	framework,	private	firms	also	contribute	to	public	welfare	as	provers	of	provide	jobs,	wages,	and,	by	extension,	the	financial	and	social	security	that	comes	with	those	provisions.44	The	African	National	Congress’	(ANC)	White	Paper	on	Social	Welfare	of	1997,	for	example,	listed	“welfare-to-work	training”	as	a	strategy	to	divert	people	from	relying	on	welfare	to	relying	on	employment.45	Salim	Vally	and	Enver	Motala	corroborate	this	in	arguing	that,	“the	casualisation	of	labour	[sic]	and	the	persistent	threat	of	joblessness	for	those	who	are	employed	are	the	inevitable	consequences	of	the	present	systems	of	production,	exchange,	distribution	and	realisation	[sic]	compounded	by	the	weaknesses	of	the	social	policies	in	dealing	with	these.”46		They	also	contend	that	the	emphasis	on	commercially	productive,	commodified	labor	renders	the	socially	reproductive	labor	that	millions	perform	invisible	and	unrewarded.47	The	way	in	which	labor	is	commodified	within	capitalist	production	often	exploits	labor	and	forces	workers	to	take	up	precarious,	insecure	work	at	the	expense	of	other	socially	beneficial	labor.48	Vally	and	Motala	elaborate:	“The	question	we	have	to	ask	is	about	how	we	conceptualize	the	difference	between	the	forms	of	work	that,	on	the	one	hand,	are	largely	responses	to	the	crisis	of	personal	and	community	lives—subsistence	and	
                                                
43 Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, 152; Jamie Peck, Workfare States, 77. 
44 Barchiesi, “Wage Labour, Citizenship, Social Discipline”, 206. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Vally and Motala, "Education, Training and Work Under Neoliberalism in South Africa: Toward 
Alternatives", 7. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 10. Hardt and Negri’s delineation of the “race to the bottom” also offers useful analysis here. 
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sub	subsistence	[...]	work—from	[...]	responding	to	the	alienating	characteristics	of	capitalist	production.”49			 SMEs	are	responsible	for	between	3%	and	60%	of	employment	and	up	to	90%	of	GDP	across	Africa.	50		In	South	Africa,	they	constitute	57%	of	GDP	and	are	responsible	for	56%	of	all	employment.51	SMEs	are	praised	for	their	aforementioned	contributions	to	African	economies,	but	it	is	important	to	contextualize	and	interrogate	the	nature	of	these	contributions.	Their	role	in	the	privatization	of	development	is	significant	and	merits	deeper	analysis	than	reducing	their	impact	to	the	aforementioned	statistics.	Thus,	the	next	chapter	provides	the	South	African	historical	and	economic	context	against	which	SMEs’	role	in	privatized	development	will	be	evaluated	in	this	study.		
	 	
                                                
49 Vally and Motala, "Education, Training and Work Under Neoliberalism in South Africa: Toward 
Alternatives”, 10. 
50 Department of Small Business Development, “Small Business Is Big Business"; Muriithi, "African Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMES) Contributions, Challenges and Solutions", 36-48.  
51 Ibid. 
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Chapter	3	
South	Africa’s	Political	Economy	of	Development		This	chapter	will	outline	South	Africa’s	neoliberal	transformation	following	its	independence	in	1994	and	the	decisions	made	by	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	to	keep	the	economy	intact.52	The	ANC	embraced	neoliberal	economic	restructuring	through	a	combination	of	SAP-imposed	and	domestically	drafted	economic	policy.53	Plans	for	managing	fiscal	debt,	attracting	investment,	and	spurring	economic	growth	followed	the	neoliberal	template	and	placed	major	emphasis	on	the	role	of	the	private	sector	in	building	the	country’s	economy.54	The	power	afforded	to	the	private	sector,	combined	with	the	neglect	of	the	poor	masses	in	the	context	of	these	plans,	bred	an	environment	of	extreme	inequality	that	persists	to	this	day.	This	setting	presents	a	ripe	landscape	for	the	emergence	of	numerous	private	enterprises	run	by	large	corporations,	parastatal	oligarchies,	and	survival	and	opportunity	entrepreneurs,	each	of	which	interact	with	neoliberalism	in	varying	ways	depending	on	their	size	and	interests.		In	April	of	1994,	the	ANC	drafted	the	Reconstruction	and	Development	Plan	(RDP)	as	its	blueprint	for	socioeconomic	transformation.55	The	strategy	inspired	great	optimism	with	its	people-centeredness,	wealth	redistribution	emphasis,	and	ambitious	growth	and	development	goals	for	the	non-white	majority.56	In	the	plan,	growth	was	defined	as	“the	
                                                
52 Maharaj, Desai, and Bond, Zuma's Own Goal, 17. 
53 Bond, "Why South Africa Should Undo Mandela's Economic Deals". 
54 Ibid. 
55 Maharaj, Desai, and Bond, Zuma's Own Goal, 10. 
56 Adelzadeh, "From the RDP to GEAR: The Gradual Embracing of Neoliberalism in Economic Policy", 
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measurable	increase	in	the	output	of	the	modern	industrial	economy”	and	development	as	“a	marginal	effort	of	redistribution	to	areas	of	urban	and	rural	poverty.”57	The	prospect	of	the	premier	liberation	movement	championing	the	journey	towards	radical	socioeconomic	uplift	for	the	masses	felt	like	an	auspicious	rebirth	for	the	country.	The	official	White	Paper	on	the	RDP,	released	in	September	of	1994,	reported	stark	deviations	from	the	redistribution	and	re-enfranchisement	platform	originally	espoused	in	the	base	document.58	Influential	party	officials	believed	that	the	redistribution	policies	were	not	in	alignment	with	neoliberal	market	principles,	which	could	jeopardize	plans	to	keep	the	economy	intact.59	As	Michael	Hardt	and	Antonio	Negri	outline,	states	orient	their	economies	to	attract	global	capital	by	subordinating	the	needs	of	labor	and	society	as	a	whole	in	what	they	term	the	“race	to	the	bottom”,	which	includes	lowering	wages	and	protections	for	laborers.60	Michael	Neocosmos	and	Bond	contend	that	the	ANC	feared	that	the	consequence	of	non-compliance	to	neoliberal	principles	would	mean	unsuccessful	integration	into	the	global	economy	as	a	new	republic.61	Thus,	in	1996,	the	ANC	abandoned	the	RDP	for	the	completely	neoliberal	Growth,	Employment	and	Redistribution	(GEAR)	program,	which	Hart	calls	“a	home-grown	version	of	structural	adjustment”.62	In	defending	this	marked	change,	Mbeki	stressed	that	“solutions	which	are	in	discord	with	the	rest	of	the	world”	were	impractical	and	unrealistic.63	
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Prioritizing	alignment	to	the	interests	of	Western	hegemonic	powers	at	the	expense	of	South	African	labor	and	society	was	an	especially	precarious	decision	that	would	set	a	bad	precedent	for	future	economic	policy.64	The	ANC	co-opted	neoliberal	economic	policy	by	way	of	trade	liberalization,	privatization	of	essential	services	and	state	assets,	securitization	of	private	property	rights,	and	the	deregulation	of	lucrative	industries	such	as	mining	and	agriculture.65	Following	the	precedent	set	by	the	RDP	WP,	fiscal	prudence	became	the	key	objective	for	sustainable	growth	redistribution	of	dispossessed	wealth	was	eliminated.66	Section	3.2.2	reads:	The	RDP	brings	 together	strategies	 to	harness	all	our	resources	 in	a	coherent	and	purposeful	 effort	 that	 can	 be	 sustained	 into	 the	 future.	 These	 strategies	 will	 be	implemented	at	national,	provincial	and	local	level	by	the	Government,	parastatals,	business	and	organisations	[sic]within	civil	society	all	working	within	the	framework	of	 the	RDP.	All	 levels	of	 government	must	pay	attention	 to	 affordability	 given	our	commitment	to	fiscal	discipline	and	to	achievable	goals.67		 With	regard	to	the	interaction	of	fiscal,	monetary	and	economic	policy,	the	WP	deviates	from	the	RDP’s	goal	to	dramatically	reconfigure	the	financial	sector	and	construct	new,	inclusive	instruments	built	on	fresh	foundations.68	Instead,	pre-existing	systems	that	privileged	wealthy,	mostly	white	actors	while	disenfranchising	Africans	were	narrowly	altered	to	include	African	elites.69	Given	their	status	as	cornerstones	of	South	Africa’s	economy,	the	mining	and	energy	sectors	are	representative	of	the	consequences	of	the	failed	reconstruction	and	de-racialization	of	the	economy.	Mining	and	energy	
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conglomerates	(MECs)	founded	by	British,	Afrikaner,	and	other	foreign	investors	enjoyed	a	monopoly	over	the	country’s	key	export	industries	and	remain	reliant	on	the	exploitation	of	black	and	migrant	labor.70	The	ANC	was	hesitant	to	disrupt	the	functioning	of	the	apartheid-inherited	economy	with	a	reconstruction	and	redistribution	mandate	in	not	only	the	MEC	sectors,	but	in	general.71	Bond	poses	the	question:	“if	white	capital	was	to	be	untouched	how	was	capitalism	in	South	Africa	to	be	de-racialized,	never	mind	decent	living	standards	achieved	for	the	[black]	majority?”72	As	a	result,	the	groups	excluded	by	imperialist	financial	instruments	continued	to	be	economically	marginalized.	The	WP	describes	the	privatization	and	deregulation	of	sectors	like	agriculture,	mining,	and	manufacturing,	which	are	historically	responsible	for	employment	of	rural,	non-white,	and	women	workers.73	Opening	up	these	sectors	to	the	free	market	allowed	competition	with	more	established,	robust,	and	healthily	subsidized	global	counterparts.74	Far	from	delivering	freedom	from	structural	economic	dispossession,	these	GEAR’s	terms	worked	to	sustain	African	economies’	marginalized	positions	in	the	global	economic	system.	GEAR’s	extensive	range	of	neoliberal	reforms	afforded	already	wealthy	capitalists	greater	opportunity	to	expand	and	solidify	their	investments	in	and	outside	of	South	Africa.	In	particular,	GEAR	initiated	the	removal	of	tariffs	that	destabilized	labor-intensive	manufacturing	industries	in	which	millions	of	low-skilled	workers	earned	their	livelihood.75	Without	participation	by	working	class	people	in	labor	policy	design	meant	
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the	voices	of	groups	with	intersectional	marginalized	identities	like	African	women,	rural	laborers,	or	migrant	workers	were	not	heard.76	Most	notably,	the	state	became	a	“manager”	of	the	transformation,	and	called	on	the	private	sector	to	drive	of	development.77	In	the	RDP	WP	preamble,	President	Nelson	Mandela	wrote:	While	both	business	and	labour	[sic]	have	the	freedom	in	a	democratic	South	Africa	to	protect	and	promote	their	immediate	interests,	it	is	the	Government's	fervent	hope	that	they	will	jointly	pursue	the	broader	challenges	of	extending	opportunity	to	the	millions	 of	 adult	 South	 Africans	 who	 can	 currently	 find	 no	 place	 in	 the	 formal	economy.78		The	GEAR	report	reads:			 In	brief,	government	consumption	expenditure	should	be	cut	back,	private	and	public	sector	wage	increases	kept	in	check,	tariff	reform	accelerated	to	compensate	for	the	depreciation	 and	 domestic	 savings	 performance	 improved.	 These	 measures	 will	counteract	 the	 inflationary	 impact	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 adjustment,	 permit	 fiscal	deficit	targets	to	be	reached,	establish	a	climate	for	continued	investor	confidence	and	facilitate	 the	 financing	 of	 both	 private	 sector	 investment	 and	 accelerated	development	expenditure.79		 		Overall,	GEAR	cast	the	state	in	the	role	of	facilitator80	in	constructing	an	enabling	environment	in	which	domestic	and	foreign	actors	like	multinational	corporations,	banks,	other	governments,	and	international	financial	institutions	could	invest,	“while	their	societies	are	being	asked	to	wait	patiently	for	the	trickle-down	benefits	of	corporate	ingenuity,”	as	Alexander	observes.81		As	neoliberal	interventions	maintain	unequal	
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macroeconomic	equilibria	that	disadvantage	emerging	economies	like	South	Africa’s,82	co-opting	these	ill-suited	policies	at	as	crucial	a	time	as	independence	squandered	the	transient	opportunity	to	genuinely	transform	the	landscape	of	economic	freedom	in	South	Africa.		It	is	important	to	note	that	even	while	the	state	is	at	the	helm	of	the	economy,	as	a	“manager”	or	otherwise,	the	state’s	agency	remains	restricted	by	transnational	neoliberal	forces.	Capital	accumulation	and	expenditure;	the	protection	or	liberalization	of	certain	industries	and	labor	markets;	and	the	scope	of	social	service	provision	is	subject	to	terms	and	conditions	from	the	IFIs	that	do	not	always	suit	the	needs	of	the	impoverished	majority.	The	GEAR	report	is	forthcoming	about	how	opening	up	the	economy	made	the	state	itself	subject	to	transnational	influences	that	limit	its	agency	to	fulfil	the	progressive,	redistributive	objectives	originally	outlined	in	the	RDP.	The	report’s	section	on	labor	market	reform	clarifies	that,	“Furthermore,	the	general	direction	of	economic	policy	is	towards	greater	openness	and	competitiveness.	The	economy	will	thus	become	increasingly	subject	to	global	forces.”	83	GEAR	was	replaced	by	the	Accelerated	and	Shared	Growth	Initiative	for	South	Africa	(ASGISA)	in	2005.84	ASGISA	was	developed	as	a	response	to	GEAR’s	discordant	effects	on	especially	economically	vulnerable	groups	like	women	and	smallholder	farmers,	even	during	the	“Africa	Rising”	commodity	boom.85	The	significant	strain	placed	on	people	who	
                                                
82 Escobar, "Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World", 
428-443. 
83 Department of Finance, Republic of South Africa, "Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A 
Macroeconomic Strategy", 19. 
84 ASGISA was followed by The New Growth Plan (NGP) of 2010, which was virtually the same thing just 
five years later. Adelzadeh, " From the RDP to GEAR: The Gradual Embracing of Neoliberalism in 
Economic Policy”, 69-74. 
85 Davies, "Accelerating Shared Growth in South Africa". 
 25 
relied	on	work	from	sectors	destroyed	by	deregulation	forced	millions	into	taking	up	insecure,	low-paying	work	in	the	informal	sector.86	Reduced	social	spending	inhibits	governments’	abilities	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	severe	job	displacement,	which	transfers	responsibility	for	adapting	to	the	economic	and	social	consequences	to	individuals	and	their	familial	units.	The	loss	of	protection	against	perils	like	unemployment	and	poverty	disproportionately	affects	women.87	For	example,	care	of	children,	the	sick,	and	the	elderly	when	privatized	healthcare	is	too	costly	or	sourcing	water	from	alternative	sources	if	privatization	makes	it	too	expensive	tends	to	be	the	responsibility	of	women	in	the	household.	This	is	because	rather	than	functioning	as	egalitarian	units,	households	operate	according	to	patriarchal	hierarchies	of	gender,	age,	and	kinship	that	usually	disadvantage	women	and	youth.88	Performing	this	unpaid	labor	leaves	women	less	time	to	earn	a	living	and	contribute	to	household	income.	The	gendered	power	differential	within	households	then	affords	men	access	to	liquid	resources	in	ways	that	both	reinforce	their	power	over	women	and	allow	them	to	cushion	themselves	against	deprivation,	thus	generally	relegating	women	and	children	to	conditions	of	chronically	lower	economic	agency	relative	to	the	men	in	their	lives.89		
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The ANC’s Neoliberal Economic Compromise			 Over	the	24-year	lifespan	of	South	Africa,	the	effects	of	neoliberalism	have	bred	high	levels	of	insecure	employment	in	the	informal	sector	and	poverty	rates	consistently	above	50%.90	Simultaneously,	South	Africa	is	also	home	to	an	incredibly	wealthy,	predominantly	white,	capitalist	class	whose	wealth	was	protected	during	the	democratic	transition	by	the	ANC’s	failure	to	completely	restructure	the	state’s	financial	apparatus.91	As	a	result,	the	country	is	characterized	as	the	most	unequal	society	in	the	world	by	multiple	standards	including	the	GINI	coefficient.92	Georges	Nzongola-Ntalaja	invokes	Frantz	Fanon	in	explaining	such	stark	disparities	in	African	postcolonial	states,	writing:	By	refusing	to	 ‘follow	the	path	of	revolution’,	as	Fanon	wrote	forty	years	ago,	such	leaders	 are	 content	 with	 playing	 the	 neo-colonial	 role	 of	 intermediary	 between	Western	capitalism	and	their	people.	The	major	consequences	of	this	option	are	the	development	of	a	state	bourgeoisie,	or	what	Fanon	called	a	‘bourgeoisie	of	the	civil	service’	bent	on	using	the	state	institutions	as	a	means	of	self-enrichment,	the	deeper	underdevelopment	of	the	country,	and	the	further	impoverishment	of	the	masses.93		Patrick	Bond	contends	that	the	abandonment	of	the	RDP	for	GEAR	was	the	seminal	failure	of	the	ANC	in	delivering	on	its	promise	for	economic	development	for	the	South	African	majority.	Instead,	fear	of	disrupting	the	state’s	relationship	with	big	business	and	Afrikaner	nationalist	capital,	as	well	as	of	being	“left	behind”	by	the	world’s	major	powers,	preempted	the	country’s	descent	into	the	neoliberalism	in	a	way	that	has	earned	South	Africa	one	of	the	highest	GINI	indices	in	the	world.94	
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Table	1:	8	fundamental	components	of	the	GEAR’s	economic	policy:		
Number	 Economic,	Monetary,	or	Fiscal	Policy	Decision	
1	 Servicing	the	USD	25	billion	apartheid-era	foreign	debt,	which	left	Mandela’s	administration	cash-strapped	and	unable	to	channel	enough	funds	into	basic	services	for	the	poor	
2	
Granting	the	South	African	Reserve	Bank	autonomy,	thereby	shielding	it	from	democratic	accountability,	which	the	Bank	subsequently	leveraged	to	raised	interest	rates	and	deregulate	exchange	controls	(both	of	which	encouraged	capital	flight)	
3	 Borrowing	USD	850	million	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	in	1993;	this	loan	carried	terms	such	as	eliminating	import	surcharges	protecting	local	industries,	reducing	public	spending,	public	sector	salaries,	and	overall	wages	
4	 Joining	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	as	a	transitional,	rather	than	a	developing	economy,	which	precluded	the	right	to	protect	labor-intensive	firms,	resulting	in	mass	job	loss	5	 Decreasing	primary	corporate	taxes	by	19%	
6	 Partially	privatizing	state	assets	like	Eskom,	Telkom	and	Transnet		
7	 Solidifying	property	rights,	thus	restricting	the	feasibility	of	land	redistribution	policies	
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8	 Allowing	the	relocation	of	large	private	firms’	head	offices	overseas,	resulting	in	balance	of	payments	deficits	and	a	reduced	sense	of	corporate	responsibility	to	national	growth	Source:	Bond,	Patrick.	"Why	South	Africa	Should	Undo	Mandela's	Economic	Deals".	The	Conversation,	2016.	http://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-undo-mandelas-economic-deals-52767.	
	
The	Lack	of	Confidence	in	the	State	
	 A	dissonance	emerged	between	the	broader	narrative	of	“Africa	Rising”	and	the	lived	experience	of	the	continued	elusiveness	of	economic	uplift	for	ordinary	Africans.	Even	during	the	“Africa	Rising”	commodity	price	boom	between	2000	and	2015,	when	a	significant	number	of	African	economies	exhibited	impressive	growth	and	a	year-on-year	decline	of	the	poverty	rate,	economic	development	was	not	proportionately	actualized	for	those	countries’	impoverished	majorities.95	When	economies	are	based	on	a	narrow	range	of	primary	commodities	and	not	sufficiently	diversified,	as	is	South	Africa’s	around	minerals	and	fossil	fuel	energy,	an	elite	group	tends	to	work	to	assert	control	over	the	key	revenue-generating	export	by	forming	patrimonial	networks	and	oligarchies	across	public	and	private	sectors.96	Partaking	of	the	wealth	is	then	contingent	on	becoming	part	of	these	networks,	which	is	both	undemocratic	as	well	as	unrealistic	for	most	ordinary	citizens.	In	the	South	African	context,	Black	Economic	Empowerment	(BEE)	is	an	example	of	this	at	play.97	Originally	a	strategy	to	include	the	non-white	majority	in	management	and	
                                                
95 United Nations Development Programme, "Primary Commodity Booms and Busts". 
96 Ncube and Lufumpa, The Emerging Middle Class in Africa, 35-36. 
97 Western Cape Government, "Black Economic Empowerment: Overview". 
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ownership	ranks,	the	system	quickly	became	a	vehicle	to	sustain	patrimonial	networks	and	enrich	an	increasingly	wealthy	few.		Many	ordinary	Africans	are	likely	to	align	with	the	Afro-pessimist	stance,	which	critiques	African	governments	for	not	properly	capitalizing	on	the	“Africa	Rising”	commodity	boom.98	The	critique	berates	states	for	failing	to	adequately	diversify	their	economies	and	instead	revel	in	the	concentration	of	wealth	amongst	elite	alliances.99	National	wealth	is	retained	amongst	patrimonial	networks	in	two	key	ways.	The	first	is	the	tender	process	in	which	private	firms	respond	to	requests	for	proposals	to	work	with	the	state	on	a	project-by-project	basis.	Annual	reports	from	the	Auditor	General	often	reveal	flagrant	corruption	in	this	process	in	which	tenders	are	awarded	to	large,	private	firms	within	the	administering	public	official’s	networks.100	Underhanded	deals	also	corrupt	this	process	when	public	officials	earn	kickbacks	to	privilege	some	firms	over	others.		The	second	way	is	in	line	with	the	neoliberal	convention	of	privatizing	state	assets:	public-private	partnerships	(PPP).	Along	with	the	privatization	of	state	assets	and	responsibilities,	PPPs	are	based	on	the	proposed	efficiency	of	the	state	outsourcing	operational	burdens	and	private	firms	winning	the	government	as	a	lucrative	client.	PPPs	are	often	entered	into	with	large,	private	corporations,	some	of	which	have	significant	foreign	financial	backing	or	part	ownership.101	The	South	African	Social	Security	Agency	(SASSA)	has	one	such	partnership	with	electronic	payments	company	Net1	to	distribute	social	grants,	the	Ilembe	District	
                                                
98 World Bank Group, "Africa Rising: A Tale of Growth, Inequality and Great Promise".  
99 Ncube and Lufumpa, The Emerging Middle Class in Africa, 36. 
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Municipality	with	Siza	Water	Company	for	water	management,	and	the	Mpumalanga	Tourism	and	Parks	Agency	with	Manyeleti	Conservation	Trust	to	manage	several	eco-tourism	reserves.102	These	partnerships	still	concentrate	wealth	amongst	well-established	firms	that	sometimes	repatriate	profits	to	large,	multinational	parent	companies,	thus	failing	to	keep	revenue	and	the	creation	of	innovative	intellectual	property	domestic.	PPPs	have	also	been	implicated	in	a	number	of	corrupt	dealings,	the	most	recent	of	which	was	between	SASSA	and	Net1.	The	North	Gauteng	High	Court	has	ordered	that	Net1	repay	SASSA	ZAR	316	million	with	interest	after	Net1	artificially	inflated	the	number	of	social	grant	recipients	it	was	serving	on	behalf	of	SASSA	and	charged	the	government	institution	accordingly.103	It	is	also	worth	inquiring	how	the	institution	responsible	for	the	dispersion	of	social	grants	to	the	poor	can	mismanage	an	amount	that	large.		The	elitism	of	tender	and	PPP	processes	further	exacerbates	the	disappointment	ordinary	citizens	have	in	their	governments.	Rife	corruption	in	such	processes	maintains	economic	underclasses	and	renders	the	promise	of	improved	material	well-being	meant	to	accompany	political	and	cultural	emancipation	unfulfilled.	Ordinary	South	Africans	are	increasingly	cognizant	of	the	ineffectuality	of	a	state	run	by	people	whose	interests	and	problems	seem	worlds	apart	from	their	own.	Bond	refers	to	the	disparities	between	those	fortunate	enough	to	be	partaking	in	wealth	and	those	in	the	majority	living	below	the	poverty	line	as	South	Africa’s	pandemic	of	unequal	and	uneven	development.104	Just	11	years	after	independence,	South	Africa	had	the	world’s	highest	increase	in	dollar	
                                                
102 South African Institute of International Affairs, "SAIIA - PPP - Ilembe – Siza Water Concession", SAIIA; 
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millionaires	per	capita	(5880	new	ones)	while	millions	lost	their	livelihoods	as	a	result	of	the	opening	up	of	labor-intensive	industries	to	the	free	market.105		
Grassroots	Dissent	with	the	Fruits	of	Neoliberalism	
		 The	South	African	masses	are	not	subjects	who	passively	accept	the	consequences	of	macroeconomic	and	political	decisions	made	on	their	behalf,	particularly	if	those	consequences	adversely	affect	their	societal	wellbeing.	The	country	exhibits	a	long	history	of	mass	labor	and	civil	society	movements	who	mobilize	and	advocate	for	themselves.106		#FeesMustFall,	a	movement	of	working-class	South	African	university	students,	is	a	pertinent	demonstration	of	a	majority	that	is	increasingly	angered	by	unequal	and	uneven	development.	The	movement	consisted	of	student	protests	against	high	university	fees	which	representatives	assert	help	maintain	historic	disparities	along	class	and	race	lines.	#FeesMustFall	began	as	a	sign	of	discontent	over	a	proposed	fee	hike	of	11.5%	for	the	2016	academic	year	‒	which	former	President	Zuma	later	repealed	‒	before	growing	into	a	platform	to	express	broader	dissent	over	the	inaccessibility	of	higher	education	for	most	non-white	South	Africans.107		South	Africa’s	first	post-apartheid	massacre	at	Marikana	is	another	relevant	example.	Apartheid-era	class,	gender,	and	racial	divides	still	have	poor	black	miners	performing	risky	work	underground	for	a	non-living	wage,	while	profits	from	the	sale	of	gold,	diamonds,	and,	in	the	case	of	Marikana,	platinum,	enrich	the	South	African	and	
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international	elite.	Intense	frustration	with	this	economic	marginalization	and	the	resultant	conditions	of	deprivation	extend	to	miners’	families	and	communities.	Protests	took	the	form	of	weeks	of	downed	tools	and,	tragically,	34	deaths	at	the	hands	of	police.108		#FeesMustFall	proves	that	it	is	not	enough	for	formerly	segregated	institutions	like	universities	to	be	desegregated,	if	historical	economic	marginalization	continues	to	systematically	exclude	the	same,	less	privileged	classes.	The	Marikana	Massacre	demonstrates	that	opportunity	for	work	is	not	enough	if	laborers	are	not	compensated	a	wage	that	affords	them	the	capabilities	they	consider	worthwhile,	like	being	able	to	pay	their	children’s	school	fees.	More	evidence	of	South	Africans’	impatience	with	the	unequal	and	uneven	development	the	neoliberal	state	is	in	the	founding	of	the	Economic	Freedom	Fighters	(EFF).	Led	by	former	Zuma-loyalist	Julius	Malema,	the	party’s	manifesto	asserts	that:	“Political	power	without	economic	emancipation	is	meaningless.”109	It	advocates	for	“radical	economic	transformation”	in	the	form	of	the	“nationalization	of	mines,	banks,	and	other	strategic	sectors	of	the	economy	without	compensation”,	the	expropriation	of	land	without	compensation	for	equitable	redistribution,	and	the	dramatic	reduction	of	foreign	ownership	and	control	of	domestic	assets	and	businesses.110	The	party’s	pro-working	class	and	expanded	economic	agency	stance	has	helped	it	become	the	third	most	influential	party	in	parliament	with	6.35%	of	seats	in	the	National	Assembly.111	It	is	surpassed	only	by	the	ANC	and	the	Democratic	Alliance,	both	of	which	boast	significant	historical	cultural	capital.		
                                                
108 News24, "Marikana Death Toll Rises to 46". 
109 EFF: Economic Freedom Fighters, "About Us".  
110 EFF: Economic Freedom Fighters, "Policy". 
111 "How Parliament Is Structured - Parliament of South Africa". 
 33 
Overall,	55.5%	of	South	Africans	live	below	the	national	poverty	line	of	USD	81	per	month,	24.6%	are	food	insecure,	and	26.6%	of	working	age	adults	are	unemployed.112	Despite	such	evidence	that	practices	like	flexible,	labor	markets;	opening	up	labor-intensive	industries	to	the	free	market;	and	a	less	interventionist	state	in	the	economy	and	social	sector	have	begat	significant	economic	and	social	insecurity	for	the	poor,	the	ANC	continues	to	repackage	neoliberal	policy	into	new	national	development	plans,	the	most	recent	of	which	is	the	National	Development	Plan	(NDP).		The	National	Planning	Commission	that	drafted	the	NDP	in	2012	(whose	second-in-command	happened	to	be	the	current	president,	Cyril	Ramaphosa)	named	8	factors	as	barriers	to	growth	and	development.	They	are:	high	unemployment;	low	quality	education	for	the	black	majority;	inadequate	infrastructure;	unchanged	apartheid-era	urban	planning	that	perpetuates	spatial	exclusion;	an	economy	that	is	over-reliant	on	mineral	exports;	low	quality	and	public	health	systems	and	other	public	services;	high	corruption	rates;	and	a	socially	divided	civil	society113	To	this	list	could	be	added	high	incidents	of	gender-based	violence,	food	insecurity,	and	low	levels	of	integration	between	rural	and	urban	service	delivery.	The	aforementioned	NDP	focus	areas	summarize	the	conditions	resulting	from	complete	adoption	of	neoliberalism	at	the	expense	of	a	genuine	transformation	in	the	material	conditions	of	the	masses.			
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Flexible	Labor	Markets	
	 What	of	the	millions	of	low-skilled,	unemployed	citizens	whose	hopes	for	development	rested	on	electing	(and	consistently	reelecting)	the	ANC?	According	to	party	rhetoric:	creating	jobs	to	increase	the	proportion	of	self-sufficient	wage	earners.114	Whether	employment	is	secure,	permanent,	or	adequately	compensated	appears	immaterial	to	the	ANC,	which	describes	any	employed,	“self-sufficient”	citizen	as	one	less	to	subsidize.115	Extreme	deregulation	and	casualization	of	the	labor	market	post-apartheid	was	used	by	the	ANC	to	support	its	job-creation-as-economic-growth	stance.116	The	emphasis	on	private	sector	job	creation	oversimplified	South	Africa’s	complex	labor	environment,	which	had	been	pillaged	by	the	liberalization	of	and	subsequent	job	loss	in	labor-intensive	industries	like	manufacturing,	clothing,	and	textiles	as	a	result	of	IMF	imposed	structural	adjustment	and	GEAR.117		As	part	of	the	NDP,	the	National	Treasury	pays	a	subsidy	to	employers	to	create	casual	jobs	for	the	young	and	unemployed	or	underemployed.118	This	casual	labor	leaves	millions	economically	insecure	despite	being	employed	in	some	capacity.	Often,	the	labor	is	performed	without	protections	like	formal	contracts,	unemployment	insurance,	or	paid	leave	clauses.119	Additionally,	the	privatization	of	essential	services	places	greater	strain	on	
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already	meager	incomes.120	Conversely,	deregulating	finance,	currency,	and	capital	markets	has	kept	the	financial	sector	healthy,	with	the	Johannesburg	Stock	Exchange	remaining	the	largest	of	its	kind	in	Africa.	Because	of	this,	colonial	and	apartheid-era	white	capital	remains	intact,	the	elite	black	bourgeois	is	enriched,	and	the	majority	forms	an	economic	underclass.	Financialization	is	largely	based	on	South	Africa’s	minerals	and	energy	sectors,	which	are	capital,	and	not	labor-intensive	industries,	further	propagating	the	economy’s	structural	bias	in	favor	of	capital	rather	than	labor.121	Neoliberalism	prioritizes	the	interests	of	capital	over	labor	in	ways	that	uninterruptedly	reproduce	socioeconomic	inequality	even	in	the	democratic	era.122		Given	that	social	welfare	for	the	country’s	impoverished	population,	which	has	risen	from	45%	in	1994	to	over	55%	currently,	would	entail	major	public	spending,	ANC	senior	strategists	were	adamant	about	the	impracticality	of	the	RDP’s	original	redistribution	agenda	while	being	cautious	not	to	reject	it	outright	in	their	rhetoric.123	In	what	Bond	famously	calls	“talking	left	and	walking	right”,	the	ANC	was	reluctant	to	roll	out	a	truly	socioeconomically	transformative	strategy,	opting	instead	to	prioritize	market	efficiency	via	reduced	public	spending,	deregulation	of	exchange	controls	to	attract	foreign	investment,	and	liberalizing	economies.124	Social	grants	have	never	been	completely	eliminated,	but	they	remain	meager	and	the	grant	system	is	not	in	and	of	itself	a	comprehensive	economic	development	strategy.	Subsequently,	the	responsibility	for	the	overall	improvement	in	material	conditions	and	socioeconomic	inclusion	is	devolved	to	
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individuals	and	private	firms	in	order	to	relieve	the	state	of	these	functions,	thereby	keeping	its	role	in	the	economy	confined	and	disengaged	from	the	original	“A	better	life	for	all”	mandate.125		
Entrepreneurship	in	South	Africa	
	 Now	in	its	24th	year	of	power,	the	ANC	is	still	committed	to	neoliberalism	and	privatization	of	human	development.	In	2014,	former	president	Zuma	launched	the	Department	of	Small	Business	Development	(DSBD)	to	operationalize	the	outsourcing	of	some	of	the	responsibilities	of	job	creation,	the	mobilization	of	skilled	labor,	and	technological	advancement	to	this	private,	entrepreneurial	group.	The	department’s	official	founding	statement	declared:		The	 Ministry	 of	 Small	 Business	 Development	 was	 established	 in	 2014	marking	 a	turning	 point	 in	 history	 of	 [small,	 medium,	 and	 micro-enterprises]	 SMME’s	 and	cooperatives	 development	 in	 South	 Africa,	 demonstrating	 Government’s	commitment	to	place	SMME’s	and	cooperatives	at	the	center	of	economic	growth	and	job	creation.126			This	chapter	provided	the	historical	and	economic	context	with	within	the	work	of	3	specific	SMEs	will	be	evaluated	in	the	next	chapter.	The	advent,	evolution,	and	contemporary	implications	of	neoliberalism’s	influence	in	the	South	African	economy	produced	a	wide	range	of	both	opportunities	and	constraints	for	SME	entrepreneurs	whose	business	models	are	based	at	the	BOP	in	the	country.	The	next	chapter	examines	how	the	work	of	SMEs	perpetuates	the	neoliberal	agenda	by	filling	vacuums	left	by	the	reduced	role	
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of	the	state	and	simultaneously	helps	the	poor	navigate	the	effects	of	the	economic	insecurity	neoliberalism	has	engendered.			
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Chapter	4	
SME	Entrepreneurship	and	Development	in	South	Africa	
		 This	chapter	will	examine	the	specific	ways	in	which	the	neoliberal	tenets	of	reducing	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	economy	and	the	privatizing	of	development	and	welfare	interact	with	regard	to	SME	entrepreneurship.	When	states	reduce	their	role	in	the	economy	in	line	with	neoliberal	principles,	businesses	step	in	to	exploit	the	opportunity	to	fill	this	vacuum.127		This	can	be	done	via	provisions	of	certain	goods	or	services	like	healthcare	and	schooling	or	by	creating	opportunities	for	wage	labor,	potentially	with	welfare	benefits.128	This	is	the	key	tenet	of	privatizing	economic	development.129	Much	research	has	been	done	on	how	large	domestic	and	multinational	corporations	occupy	these	spaces,	but	SMEs	also	play	a	role.		The	provision	of	jobs	and	essential	services	by	SMEs	can	mitigate	some	of	the	economic	insecurity	that	stems	from	implications	of	neoliberalism	across	various	segments	of	the	population.	Generally,	this	takes	the	form	of	creating	jobs,	which,	paradoxically,	is	in	alignment	with	the	wage	labor	as	welfare	argument,	and	providing	goods	and	services	tailored	for	the	poor	like	alternative	informal	savings	instruments.	While	they	affect	change	only	in	proportion	to	their	small	to	medium	size	and	often	function	as	disparate,	individually	productive	silos,	SMEs	in	South	Africa	constitute	57%	of	GDP	and	are	
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responsible	for	56%	of	all	employment.130	Their	sizeable	impact	warrants	the	study	of	their	contradictory	role	as	both	proponents	of	the	privatization	of	development	and	as	agents	to	help	people	navigate	the	economic	insecurities	induced	by	the	reduced	role	of	the	state.	The	business	models	of	four	different	firms	that	span	the	financial,	household	services,	and	education	sectors	are	examined	in	an	attempt	to	understand	the	tensions	that	exist	due	to	this	dual	nature	of	SMEs.		
Case	Studies	
StokFella:	Pro-Poor	Informal	Savings	and	Investment	Mechanisms	
	 Across	Africa,	people	band	together	to	form	informal,	self-led	savings	groups.	In	South	Africa,	these	are	called	stokvels.131	Members	contribute	a	specific	amount	of	money	to	a	collective	fund	at	regular	intervals	and	each	month,	a	different	member	collects	the	total	and	can	spend	it	as	they	wish.	Alternatively,	the	collective	fund	is	invested	rather	than	paid	out	in	order	to	earn	more	interest	than	could	have	been	earned	by	an	individual	saver.	The	dividends	at	year’s	end	are	evenly	distributed	amongst	members	to	use	to	pay	school	fees,	put	down	a	deposit	for	a	car,	or	start	a	small	business.	Against	a	backdrop	of	shrinking	subsidies	for	the	poor,	these	community-led	financial	safety	nets	are	a	lifeline	for	many.	The	2017	Old	Mutual	Savings	and	Investment	Monitor	survey	revealed	that	for	the	black	
                                                
130 Department of Small Business Development, “Small Business Is Big Business"; Muriithi, "African Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Contributions, Challenges and Solutions", 36-48. 
131 Varying versions exist in the form of chamas (or harambees for one-time collective fundraising) in 
Kenya, susus in Ghana, and numerous others across the continent. Osei-Assibey, "What Drives 
Behavioral Intention of Mobile Money Adoption? The Case of Ancient Susu Saving Operations in Ghana", 
962-979; Kinyanjui, Women and the Informal Economy in Urban Africa, 99-103. 
 40 
South	African	majority,	53%	of	informal	saving	is	through	stokvels.132		This	is	compelling	as	informal	savings	are	second	only	to	funeral	insurance	as	the	preferred	method	of	saving	and	investing	for	lower	and	middle	class	South	Africans.133	The	informality	of	stokvels	can	lead	to	administrative	pitfalls.	The	risks	of	money	mismanagement	are	far	greater	when	multiple	individuals’	savings	or	investments,	and,	by	extension,	those	of	their	families,	are	at	stake.	StokFella,	a	startup	that	allows	stokvel	administrators	to	manage	the	group’s	finances	and	find	opportunities	to	earn	greater	returns	on	funds,	works	to	remedy	this.	Five-member	stokvels	can	use	the	free,	basic	version	of	the	software.	Larger	stokvels	pay	transaction	fees	on	each	contribution	or	withdrawal	made.134	The	StokFella	mobile	application’s	5000	downloads	in	2017,	its	first	year	of	operation,	are	minor	in	this	billion-rand	industry	but	in	line	with	South	Africa’s	high	mobile	penetration	rate.135	Founder	Tshepo	Moloi	notes	that	high	broadband	fees	in	South	Africa	(as	in	much	of	Africa)	are	still	a	major	deterrent	to	using	the	application	as	regularly	as	is	useful.136		In	addition	to	the	aforementioned	administrative	benefits	obtained	from	a	system	like	StokFella,	scaling	the	business	model	can	have	positive	implications	for	helping	low-income	earners	build	credit	through	monitoring	their	regular	deposits	to	their	stokvels.	Moloi’s	vision	for	StokFella	is	to	financially	empower	South	Africa’s	low	and	middle	classes	by	streamlining	their	informal	savings	mechanisms	and	developing	alternative,	pro-poor	methods	to	build	creditworthiness.	Moloi	explains:	“We	are	targeting	
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black	households	that	are	interested	in	building	a	financial	portfolio,	as	the	app	looks	to	open	the	doors	to	greater	market	opportunities	for	those	with	informal	saving	vehicles.”137	The	model	has	an	Africa-wide	market	given	the	ubiquity	of	stokvel-esque	community	saving	mechanisms	across	the	continent.	Low	levels	of	regional	economic	integration	that	do	not	allow	entrepreneurs,	like	Moloi,	to	scale	such	broadly	applicable	businesses	and	technology	across	the	continent	is	an	issue	worth	exploration.		The	necessity	of	stokvels	and	the	size	of	the	ZAR	49	billion	industry	in	South	Africa	highlight	the	privatization	and	individualization	of	social	security.138		The	financial	safety	nets	offered	by	stokvels	help	people	balance	earning	low,	irregular	incomes	with	paying	for	privatized	or	only	lightly	subsidized	social	services	like	healthcare,	utilities,	and	education.	Stokvels	are	also	simpler,	more	affordable,	and	less	intimidating	savings	vehicles	than	formal	banks	which	often	charge	fees	unsuited	to	people	earning	low,	unpredictable	incomes	from	casual,	flexible,	and	informal	labor.	South	Africa’s	big	banks,	including	the	entirely	privatized	Reserve	Bank,	are	owned	by	oligarchies	of	foreign	and	elite	local	investors	-	recently	and	infamously	christened	white	monopoly	capital.139	The	oligarchies’	control	over	major	segments	of	the	economy	has	pre-1994	roots	and	survived	the	democratic	transition.140	The	ANC’s	preferential	treatment	of	the	interests	of	capital	
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owners	over	those	of	laborers	is	certainly	evident	when	one	considers	the	unemployment	pandemic	that	necessitates	stokvels	as	a	form	of	individualized	social	security.141			
SweepSouth:	Flexible	Labor	Markets	and	the	Rise	of	the	Gig	Economy	
	 Stokvels	have	served	domestic	workers	for	decades.	SweepSouth,	an	SME,	is	an	on-demand	domestic	cleaning	service	that	uses	a	mobile	application	to	connect	experienced	domestic	workers	with	people	who	need	their	services	on	a	regular	or	ad	hoc	basis.142	Domestic	workers	in	South	Africa	are	predominantly	undereducated	and	low	earning	black	women	who	oftentimes	are	the	breadwinners	for	their	families.	A	majority	of	the	6000	women	the	platform	has	worked	with	were	previously	either	underemployed	or	unemployed.143	Finding	opportunities	for	employment	in	low	skill	occupations	like	domestic	cleaning,	plumbing,	or	carpentry	often	takes	place	in	highly	informal,	unregulated	forms.144	These	can	be	referrals	through	personal	networks	or	potential	employees	that	stand	with	“worker	for	hire”	signs	at	traffic	lights.	Obtaining	work	through	these	means	leaves	laborers	incredibly	vulnerable	to	the	multitude	of	drawbacks	of	the	casual	labor	economy.	For	example,	lack	of	a	formal	contract	offers	workers	no	legal	forum	in	which	to	handle	disputes	like	not	being	paid	fairly,	being	made	to	work	in	terrible	conditions,	or	working	for	long	periods	without	rest.		
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Because	domestic	cleaning	and	plumbing	typically	occur	inside	private	homes,	the	casual	laborer	in	someone	else’s	domain	is	subject	to	a	steep	power	asymmetry;	this	leaves	women,	particularly	vulnerable	to	exploitation.	When	performing	casual	labor,	women	report	experiencing	anxiety	due	to:	sexual	and	physical	assault,	being	locked	onto	premises	and	forced	to	work	longer	hours,	and	walking	alone	after	dark	to	public	transport	hubs.145	Joining	SweepSouth	as	contractual	workers	mitigates	some	of	these	concerns.	As	a	part	of	SweepSouth,	domestic	workers	gain	three	advantages:	1)	working	within	a	fixed	set	of	hours	that	are	compensated	at	living-wage,	2)	an	operational	team	who	knows	their	location	of	work	at	all	times,	and	3)	insurance	by	SweepSouth	against	accidental	damage	to	client	property	for	which	they	would	have	otherwise	been	liable.		This	formalization	of	pockets	of	the	informal	economy	also	increases	the	proportion	of	formally	banked	workers.	SweepSouth	brokered	a	partnership	with	First	National	Bank	to	provide	cleaners	with	low-fee	accounts	in	which	to	deposit	their	wages.146	Many	cleaners	were	previously	unbanked	or	had	accounts	with	fee	structures	ill-suited	to	their	low	incomes.147	Having	a	bank	account	serves	as	an	entry	point	for	increased	economic	agency	in	other	ways	such	as	building	creditworthiness,	receiving	loans,	and	having	a	secure	place	to	accrue	savings.	The	economic	agency-enhancing	effects	of	this	cannot	be	overstated,	especially	for	lower	class	women.	The	formalization	of	casual	labor	is	particularly	relevant	given	that	Sub-Saharan	Africa’s	informal	economy	possesses	an	abundance	of	economic	activity	and	is	where	millions	make	their	livelihood.148	Sub	Saharan	
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Africa’s	informal	economy	constitutes	approximately	40%	of	GDP	on	average,	although	variation	is	large.149	In	South	Africa,	the	informal	sector	is	estimated	to	equate	about	20%	of	GDP,	whereas	in	Nigeria	and	Tanzania	the	estimate	is	as	high	as	60%.150	In	terms	of	economic	growth,	the	formalization	of	segments	of	the	informal	sector	also	expands	the	state’s	taxation	base.		SweepSouth’s	approach	to	job	creation	is	a	useful	instance	with	which	to	evaluate	flexible	labor	markets.	In	terms	of	contractual	labor	in	her	business	model,	co-founder	Aisha	Pandor	explains:	The	way	we	are	able	to	[pay	above	minimum	wage]	is	we	say	[to	clients],	‘You’re	not	able	to	pay	someone	[to	work	for	you]	full-time,	every	single	day	but	then	what	you	can	do	is	employ	someone	once	or	twice	a	week	and	our	service	takes	care	of	[them]	the	 rest	 of	 the	 time.	 So	 you’re	 spreading	 [the	 domestic	worker’s	wages]	 between	different	customers.151		To	date,	6000	domestic	workers	have	used	the	platform	to	find	work.152	In	a	2018	television	interview,	Pandor	reflects	on	how	she	and	co-founder,	Alen	Ribic,	“were	on	the	ground	speaking	to	domestic	workers	in	our	neighborhood	to	spread	the	word	[...]	The	network	effects	[that	come	about	as	a	result	of]	high	unemployment	rates	in	informal	areas	[mean]	we	literally	are	trying	to	keep	up.”153		Pandor	notes	that	while	the	idea	for	SweepSouth	was	inspired	by	her	own	struggle	to	hire	a	domestic	worker,	conversations	with	the	first	few	women	she	recruited	revealed	to	her	the	struggles	women	faced	due	to	the	informality	of	the	sector.	She	decided	to	actively	address	both	the	challenges	faced	by	domestic	workers	to	find	employment	and	
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those	faced	by	consumers	to	find	and	hire	ad	hoc	cleaners.154	Pandor	declared	that	she	and	her	co-founder	set	out	to	achieve	a	number	of	objectives	in	founding	the	company.155	First,	she	reiterates	the	purpose	of	the	company	to	connect	people	who	can	offer	domestic	work	services	to	those	who	need	them.	Second	is:	setting	decent	rates	that	are	far	above	minimum	wage.	[Next]	is	obviously	addressing	unemployment	 and	 underemployment.	 70%	 of	 people	 who	 joined	 our	 platform	 -	although	they	are	all	skilled	-	were	unemployed.	30%	[were]	underemployed.	We	also	like	to	think	of	impact	not	just	in	terms	of	the	domestic	workers	on	the	platform,	but	also	what	 that	means	 for	 their	 families.	 Lastly,	we’re	 also	 trying	 to	 address	 skills	building	and	upskilling	domestic	workers.156			It	is	important,	however,	to	assess	the	types	of	jobs	SMEs	like	SweepSouth	create	and	not	fall	into	the	ANC’s	pattern	of	counting	any	labor	as	unreservedly	beneficial,	regardless	of	precariousness	and	the	unpredictability	of	the	income	and	financial	security	it	affords	workers.	Here,	a	contradiction	arises	in	how	SweepSouth	addresses	high	unemployment	rates	by	leveraging	flexible	labor	markets.	While	earning	wages	is	beneficial	for	the	domestic	workers,	operating	as	independent	contractors	does	not	afford	them	the	same	protections	as	full-time	workers,	nor	does	it	pay	them	enough	for	them	to	be	financially	secure,	especially	if	they	have	families	to	provide	for.	Low	wages	also	prevent	workers	privatized	social	services.	Pandor	reveals	that	according	to	the	media,	providing	employment	of	any	kinds	is	portrayed	a	socially	productive	feat.	Simultaneously,	she	observes	that	structural	inefficiencies	prevent	her	from	sustaining	this	job	creation	in	spite	of	its	casual	nature.	She	notes:	SweepSouth	 is	 literally	 being	 paraded	 all	 over	 the	 city	 and	 country	 as	 a	 company	doing	a	great	job	at	job	creation	but	every	single	day	there’s	an	issue	with	transport.	You	definitely	get	to	a	point	in	your	growth	where	this	really	gets	in	the	way	of	you	scaling.	When	you’re	 trying	 to	get	 from	1	 to	10	 [customers]	you’re	 focused	on	 the	
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more	 immediate	 operations	 of	 the	 business	 environment,	 but	 when	 you’re	 really	trying	to	scale,	external	realities	become	a	lot	more	relevant.157		Above,	Pandor	refers	to	one	of	the	many	challenges	SweepSouth	faces	in	its	work	at	the	BOP	in	South	Africa:	dealing	with	historical	legacies	of	exclusion	and	segregation	in	urban	planning.	SweepSouth’s	headquarters	are	based	in	Cape	Town,	which	exhibits	an	apartheid-era	urban	planning	landscape.158	Historically	and	predominantly	Black	and	Coloured	townships	were	built	to	be	far	from	the	central	business	district	in	the	city	center	and	from	historically	and	predominantly	white	suburbs.	Even	though	political	apartheid	ended	in	1994,	apartheid-era	settlement	patterns	resemble	those	enforced	through	the	Group	Areas	Act.159	Thus,	to	travel	into	the	city	or	suburbs	to	work,	cleaners	rely	on	public	transportation,	much	of	which	is	privatized	by	the	unregulated,	mafia-esque	minibus	taxi	industry.		The	industry	is	estimated	to	be	worth	between	USD	4	billion	and	USD	8	billion	and	is	host	to	a	lucrative	network	of	untaxed	entrepreneurs.160	Taxis	run	on	their	own	dynamic	schedules	and	routes	that	prioritize	profits	over	efficiency	for	commuters.	For	example,	a	taxi	needs	to	fill	to	capacity	(about	14	commuters)	before	it	will	depart	from	a	terminal,	no	matter	how	long	that	takes.	This	makes	it	difficult	for	workers	to	estimate	their	arrival	time	to	work	in	the	morning	or	home	at	night.161	Unfortunately,	the	national	train	service,	laden	with	delays	and	operating	within	stations	rife	with	theft,	does	not	offer	a	viable	solution.		Johannesburg’s	Rea	Vaya	Bus	Rapid	Transit	(BRT)	System	was	the	government’s	attempt	to	
                                                
157 Pandor, interview with author January 7, 2018. 
158 Maharaj, "The Group Areas Act and Community Destruction in South Africa", 1-25. 
159 The law that mandated segregation of residential and commercial settlements by race, which was 
violently enforced through forced removals. Ibid. 
160 In April 2018 exchange rates. "How Much Money Taxis Make in South Africa". 
161 Pandor, interview with author January 7, 2018. 
 47 
compete	with	the	taxi	industry,	but	BRT	busses	run	less	often	and	on	less	extensive	routes,	making	the	service	less	competitive	than	the	taxi	industry.	162	In	addition,	the	aforementioned	apartheid-era	urban	planning	requires	cleaners	to	travel	by	foot	to	reach	transportation	hubs,	which	can	be	dangerous	for	women	late	at	night	or	early	in	the	morning.	For	women,	trekking	those	distances	early	in	the	morning	or	late	at	night	exposes	them	to	gender-based	violence.	Sadly,	this	violence	occurs	inside	South	African	households	as	well.	Pandor	reports	that	incidents	of	domestic	violence	prevent	women	continued	work	with	SweepSouth.	The	lack	of	adequate	structures	to	address	crime	and	violence	in	many	South	African	cities	poses	a	hurdle	for	SweepSouth	in	terms	safety	for	both	cleaners	and	clients.163	Pandor	reports	that	the	company	has	to	convince	potential	clients	that	it	is	safe	to	have	their	cleaners	come	into	their	homes.	In	fact,	a	major	selling	point	of	SweepSouth,	particularly	in	Johannesburg,	is	that	the	cleaners	are	vetted,	unlike	in	the	case	of	hiring	a	casual	laborer.164	This	certainly	reflects	the	air	of	distrust	that	still	plagues	race	and	class	relations	in	South	African	society.	The	divide	between	low	class	and	middle	class	tends	to	run	along	black-white	race	lines.		While	the	company	acts	as	a	connector	platform,	most	of	the	time	domestic	workers	make	their	own	way	to	and	from	work	and	communicate	both	with	SweepSouth	management	and	their	clients	via	a	designated	mobile	application,	phone	calls,	or	text/Whatsapp	messages.	Thus,	communication	is	a	major	component	of	the	ability	to	successfully	work	remotely.	The	high	cost	of	mobile	data	in	South	Africa	and	unreliable	
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connectivity	in	the	impoverished	areas	in	which	cleaners	tend	to	live	reflect	inadequate	communication	and	internet	infrastructure.165	This	is	alarming	given	the	pointed	move	industries	are	making	in	the	digital	direction.	Pandor	recalls	being	shocked	at	how	difficult	it	was	to	perform	simple	business	setup	tasks.	She	notes	that	registering	the	business	with	the	Companies	and	Intellectual	Properties	Commission	took	several	weeks,	as	did	setting	up	a	business	bank	account.166	Pandor	reveals	that	the	difficulty	in	finding	and	setting	up	an	account	that	would	serve	the	specific	needs	of	an	SME	like	SweepSouth	does	not	correlate	with	the	assertion	by	governmental	bodies	like	the	Departments	of	Small	Business	Development	or	Trade	and	Industry	of	their	commitment	to	foster	a	thriving	entrepreneurship	ecosystem.167	Additionally,	Pandor	remarks	that	filling	technical,	software	engineering	roles	with	skilled	talent	is	difficult,	which	she	believes	highlights	the	inadequate	training	of	a	highly	skilled	labor	force	in	the	country.168	Pandor	feels	that	the	physical,	communication,	and	financial	infrastructures	of	South	Africa	are	not	conducive	for	startups	to	achieve	substantive	development	goals.169	
	
Clock	Education:	Skills,	Education,	and	Digital	Literacy	
	 Kola	Olajide	is	the	co-founder	of	Clock	Education,	a	software	development	firm	built	to	streamline	knowledge	creation,	retention,	and	dissemination	within	educational	institutions	around	Africa.170	Clock	Education	sells	software	that	allows	educators	to	
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digitize	their	lessons,	track	each	student’s	progress,	and	design	individualized	learning	plans	that	can	be	administered	over	the	digital	platform.171	Of	the	company’s	target	audience,	Olajide	shared,	“One	of	the	happiest	days	of	my	life	was	when	a	50-year-old	woman,	a	teacher	in	Cape	Town,	used	Clock	to	digitize	her	classroom	without	even	contacting	us.	She	didn’t	need	to	contact	us	with	any	issues	or	queries	...	[She]	just	did	it.”172		Olajide	indicated	that	such	stories	reflect	Clock’s	ideal	impact	on	the	education	space.	Regrettably,	Olajide	asserts	that	schools	in	South	Africa	are	not	forward-thinking	when	it	comes	to	technology	and	thus	were	not	primed	to	use	Clock	Education’s	product	at	a	rate	that	would	sustain	the	firm.173	This	is	troubling	because	in	this	day	and	age,	digital	literacy	is	a	crucial	rather	than	supplementary	part	of	a	complete	education.	Neglecting	digital	literacy	is	disadvantaging	the	African	child	from	an	incredibly	early	stage.	Olajide	elaborated	that	he	understands	that	many	schools	with	which	his	firm	has	tried	to	work	are	still	facing	grassroot	problems	like	retaining	quality	teachers,	getting	textbooks	delivered	on	time,	and	having	suitable	infrastructure.174	Thus,	Olajide	poses	the	question,	“How	can	you	[think	about]	rolling	out	personalized	recommendations	based	on	individualized	metric	tracking	for	each	student	(a	service	Clock	often	writes	into	software	for	schools)	when	teachers	don’t	even	have	email	addresses?	There	are	a	lot	of	grassroots	problems	schools	need	to	take	care	of	before	they	can	take	advantage	of	the	technology	that’s	available.”175		
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An	education	system	unprimed	for	the	entrepreneur	to	influence	necessitated	a	pivot	to	focusing	on	corporations	with	whom	working	made	financial	sense.	“I’m	not	passionate	about	corporates.	K	-	12	education	is	where	the	passion	is	and	we	really	believe	we	can	turn	that	[sector]	around,	but	it’s	very	clear	that	[the	sector	is]	not	ready.”176		Olajide	outlines	his	motivation	for	starting	Clock	Technologies	as	his	passion	for	[grade]	K	to	12	education.	He	elaborates	that,	“As	a	company,	we	are	trying	to	accelerate	the	progress	of	[that	space].”177	In	reference	to	seeing	teachers	take	advantage	of	Clock’s	software	to	digitize	and	improve	their	classes,	Olajide	reveals,	“That’s	what	excites	me.	Not	[that]	we	made	$100,000.”178			 The	company	has	also	branched	out	in	efforts	to	try	and	meet	the	education	sector	where	it	is,	rather	than	waiting	for	it	to	mature,	by	designing	software	that	addresses	some	of	the	more	fundamental	issues	plaguing	K	-	12	education.	As	of	2018,	this	has	taken	the	form	of	a	diagnostic	tool	as,	“the	first	step	to	creating	a	solution	is	know[ing]	you	have	a	problem.”179		The	tool	allows	schools	to	sign	up	to	design	tailored,	automatically	graded	tests	that	dramatically	reduce	the	amount	of	time	teachers	spend	going	through	individual	results.	This	frees	up	time	for	teachers	to	focus	on	recommendations	and	remedial	support	and	can	be	a	great	help	for	understaffed	public	schools	in	which	one	teacher	can	be	assigned	between	50	and	100	students,	above	the	legal	1:40	ratio	set	by	the	Ministry	of	Basic	Education.180	Olajide	also	cites	the	difficulty	of	fundraising,	unreliability	of	internet	connectivity,	and	low	access	to	technical	talent	as	key	pain	points.	With	regard	to	Clock’s	
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fundraising	journey,	Olajide	explains	that	he	knew	capital	from	South	African	investors	was	not	something	on	which	he	could	count.		Most	capital	allocated	to	startup	funding	lives	outside	of	Africa.	Kola	asserts	that	Africans	with	enough	wealth	to	invest	at	the	appropriate	volumes	prefer	investing	in	more	traditional,	tangible	assets	like	minerals.181	Olajide	proposes	that	partnerships	composed	of	domestic	startups,	national	institutions	like	reserve	banks,	the	public	sector,	and	established	private	sector	multinational	companies	need	to	be	forged.182	Additionally,	he	espouses	that	entrepreneurs	in	the	African	context	should	not	attempt	to	reinvent	the	wheel	but	instead	leverage	the	insights	that	bigger	corporations,	African	or	not,	have	garnered.183	In	light	of	this,	Olajide	sees	entrepreneurs	exercising	their	constitutive	freedom	as	agents	of	development	by,	“taking	advantage	of	their	positions	and	becoming	the	nucleus	[that	connects]	the	right	people	to	create	innovative	solutions.”184	Olajide	also	works	as	a	technical	advisor	for	several	digital	companies,	including	Microsoft,	and	uses	his	positions	there	as	an	example.	“I	can	easily	connect	the	dots	[between	the	different	digital	firms	I	consult	for]	to	tell	you	how	people	need	to	work	together	to	create	solutions,”	he	adds.185	
	
	
	
	
                                                
181 Olajide alludes to Dangote, the richest man in Africa with investments in cement, sugar, iron, and iron 
amongst other, similar commodities. Ref: "Bloomberg Billionaires Index - Aliko Dangote", 2018. 
182 Kola Olajide, interview with author, January, 3, 2018. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
 52 
The	Limitations	of	Entrepreneurship	for	Development	
		 According	to	all	3	entrepreneurs,	certain	aspects	of	the	South	African	Reserve	Bank’s	monetary	policy	are	unfavorable	to	SME	entrepreneurs.	Olajide	explains	that	his	qualm	is	that	for	a	smooth	exit,	a	business’	intellectual	property	needs	to	live	outside	of	South	Africa	or	risk	losing	30%	of	its	sale	price	in	fees	to	the	Reserve	Bank.	These	unfavorable	intellectual	property	(IP)	rights	are	a	significant	roadblock,	according	to	Olajide,	who	notes	that	in	an	exit,	they	are	a	business’	greatest	assets.	Olajide	explains	that	diligent	investors	are	well	aware	of	the	restraints	that	the	South	African	Reserve	Bank	(SARB)	places	on	being	able	to	invest	in	South	African	companies.	Olajide	observes	that,	“The	SARB	is	a	big	bottleneck	[that]	is	not	trying	to	make	[entrepreneurs’	and	investors’]	lives	easier.”186	Pandor	adds,	“Sometimes	[I	think]:	I	don’t	need	[the	state]	to	help	-	I	just	need	[the	state]	to	not	mess	it	up.	I	need	the	government	to	think,	‘How	do	we	step	back	and	allow	(SME	success)	to	happen’?”187	Moloi’s	vision	for	StokFella	is	to	support	low	to	middle	class	households	and	individuals	increase	their	financial	security	through	streamlining	their	informal	savings	mechanisms	and	developing	alternative,	pro-poor	methods	to	build	creditworthiness.188	He	explains	that	the	firm,	“are	targeting	black	households	that	are	interested	in	building	a	financial	portfolio,	as	the	app	looks	to	open	the	doors	to	greater	market	opportunities	for	those	with	informal	saving	vehicles.”	189		Above,	we	see	each	entrepreneur’s	need	for	relaxed	capital,	credit,	and	finance	markets	as	well	as	how	the	gains	they	anticipate	therein	are	major	incentives	for	their	
                                                
186 Ibid. 
187 Aisha Pandor, interview with author, Cape Town, January 7, 2018. 
188 Skade, "Stokfella: Bringing Financial Inclusion to Black People".  
189 Ibid. 
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businesses.	For	each	entrepreneur	in	question,	running	a	profitable	business	and	pursuing	development	objectives	are	equally	weighted	goals.	These	objectives	are:	to	create	jobs,	streamline	informal	work	and	savings	vehicles,	and	design	technology	for	education.	Nevertheless,	this	chapter	demonstrates	that	decisions	on	creating,	running,	and	growing	SMEs	are	not	made	in	a	vacuum,	but	are	themselves	products	and	perpetuators	of	broader	systems	of	neoliberal	economic	organization.	
	
Entrepreneurship’s	Gender	Bias	
	 Another	distinct	way	in	which	neoliberal	economic	principles	negate	the	inherent	inequality	in	its	prioritization	of	market	primacy	via	entrepreneurship	is	its	gender	bias.	Championing	entrepreneurship	as	South	Africa’s	development	silver	bullet	takes	for	granted	that	men	and	women	have	equal	access	to	productive	assets	like	capital,	property,	and	credit	histories	in	order	to	build	these	SMEs.	Pandor	agrees,	remarking:	“A	disproportionate	number	of	South	African	households	are	headed	by	single	mothers	(50-64%)	which	means	that	many	women	cannot	responsibly	take	the	risks	of	entrepreneurship	without	having	a	partner	with	a	stable	job	[...]	It	is	also	more	difficult	for	women	to	start	businesses	and	secure	business	financing.”190	For	example,	accruing	enough	personal	savings	to	use	as	capital	is	easier	for	men	who	are	paid	more	than	women	for	equal	work.191		
                                                
190 "Aisha Pandor: The Uber of Cleaning, African Style", She Inspires Her.  
191 Madzwamuse, "Economic Justice as a Site for Women’s Empowerment". 
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Women	also	are	more	likely	to	work	in	the	informal	sector,	which	tends	to	pay	lower	wages	than	the	formal	sector.192	Informal	sector	work	does	not	offer	formal	benefits	like	health	insurance,	which	means	workers	need	to	pay	for	such	amenities	out	of	pocket	m.	Additionally,	women’s	overrepresentation	in	performing	unpaid	social	reproductive	labor	in	the	private	sphere	further	disadvantages	them	financially	and	makes	it	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	for	them	to	take	the	financial	risk	of	starting	a	business.193	The	aforementioned	limitations	also	apply	to	building	credit	and	getting	loans	to	start	and	run	businesses.	Evelyn	Derera,	Pepukayi	Chitakunye,	and	Charles	O’Neill	contend	that	women’s	lower	formal	economic	activity	paints	them	as	high-risk	borrowers	who	are	likely	to	be	required	to	put	up	more	collateral,	pay	higher	interest	rates,	or	be	approved	for	shorter	term	loans.194	Women	also	constantly	navigate	gender-based	discrimination	that	undermines	their	capabilities	in	business,	which	hinders	women’s	success	with	SMEs.	
	
	
Development	without	Democratic	Accountability?	
		 Ultimately,	championing	entrepreneurship	as	a	silver	bullet	for	development	is	not	a	break	from	the	neoliberal	tradition	that	has	crippled	the	livelihoods	of	many	working	and	middle	class	South	Africans.	A	thriving	entrepreneurial	ecosystem	relies	on	the	free	market	in	which	capital	accumulation	and	profit,	not	social	and	economic	security	for	the	poor,	are	the	objectives	around	which	interventions	are	designed.	Although	many	entrepreneurs	choose	to	use	their	agency	to	try	and	achieve	development	objectives,	their	development	
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Entrepreneurs in South Africa", 107-111. 
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contributions	are	optional,	and	they	are	not	accountable	to	any	democratic	processes	or	bodies.195	Lastly,	for	firms	that	attempt	to	strike	a	perfect	balance	between	profiting	off	of	helping	the	poor	and	actually	helping	the	poor,	running	a	business	is	not	without	its	operational	and	structural	hurdles.	Despite	SMEs’	progress	in	creating	jobs	and	contributing	substantially	to	African	economies,	their	impact	is	still	in	proportion	to	their	small	to	medium	size.	
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Chapter	5	
Conclusion	
	The	rolling	back	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	economy	and	social	sector,	and	the	accompanying	privatization	of	economic	development	has	wreaked	havoc	on	the	lives	of	millions	of	South	Africans.	Presently,	55.5%	live	below	the	national	poverty	line	of	USD	81	per	month,	24.6%	are	food	insecure,	and	26.6%	of	working	age	adults	are	unemployed.196	The	capacity	of	South	African	SME	entrepreneurs	to	cater	to	various	segments	of	the	population’s	poor	in	ways	tailored	to	their	circumstances	can	help	offset	the	disparaging	effects	of	neoliberal	economic	policy.	However,	relegating	the	responsibility	of	remedying	these	conditions	to	a	private,	entrepreneurial	class	is	in	paradoxical	alignment	with	the	neoliberal	principles	that	engender	these	economic	and	social	insecurities.		Thus,	the	role	of	SME	entrepreneurship	in	development	is	not	a	break	from	the	neoliberal	tradition	that	has	crippled	the	livelihoods	of	many	working	and	middle	class	South	Africans.	Simultaneously,	the	SME	entrepreneurs	interviewed	in	this	study,	like	many	others,	are	of	the	opinion	that	they	contribute	positively	to	economic	development	by	creating	jobs,	helping	people	save	and	invest	securely,	and	financing	the	growth	of	other	enterprises.	An	analysis	of	their	business	models	revealed	the	tensions	and	contradictory	nature	of	their	work	as,	in	many	instances,	neoliberal	constructs	like	flexible	labor	markets	and	relaxed	regulation	surrounding	capital	flows	were	crucial	to	the	success	of	their	enterprises.	Moreover,	the	case	studies	revealed	that	in	addition	to	navigating	these	
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tensions,	there	are	structural	inefficiencies	that	inhibit	the	ability	of	SMEs	to	successfully	grow.	A	lack	of	public	sector	investment	in	infrastructure	and	skilled	labor	were	common	themes	in	this	study’s	interview	data.	This	indicates	additional	tensions	in	neoliberalism’s	relegation	of	development	objectives	to	a	private,	entrepreneurial	class	that	does	not	have	sufficient	access	to	the	relevant	inputs.		Given	the	highly	integrated	nature	of	the	global	economic	system,	it	is	also	important	to	note	the	range	of	transnational	influences	the	South	African	government	is	subject	to,	limits	its	agency.	Ties	to	international	capital	extend	into	South	Africa’s	colonial	and	apartheid	eras	and	survived	the	democratic	transition.197	Mainly,	this	took	the	form	of	abandoning	the	RDP	agenda	in	favor	of	keeping	the	pre-1994	economy	intact;	taking	on	a	USD	850	million	IMF	loan	and	the	accompanying	Structural	Adjustment	Plan	in	1993;	and	solidifying	neoliberalism’s	centrality	in	the	South	African	economy	through	GEAR.	This	interplay	of	domestic	and	global	forces	has	produced	a	state	that	is	subject	to	the	neoliberal	project	in	ways	that	tend	to	the	interests	of	an	elite,	transnational,	capitalist	class	at	the	expense	of	the	impoverished	majority.			The	state	needs	to	fulfill	its	role	as	the	primary	agent	of	development	by	using	its	agency	in	various	ways.	First,	it	must	advocate	for	more	favorable	integration	of	South	Africa	and	its	African	neighbors	into	the	global	economy	within	the	constraints	of	the	undemocratic,	neoliberal	global	economic	system.	This	can	take	the	form	of	leveraging	the	power	of	negotiating	as	regional	blocs;	increasing	the	proportion	of	intra-Africa	trade	as	an	alternative,	more	sustainable	and	autonomous	source	of	growth;	and	diversifying	national	economies.	Second,	as	Bond	notes,	the	ANC	needs	to	reconsider	the	effects	of	the	economic	
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compromises	made	in	the	1990s.	If	it	is	to	regain	cultural	legitimacy	as	a	party	whose	interests	align	with	those	of	the	majority,	the	ANC	will	have	to	temper	its	hyper-neoliberal	position	and	embrace	its	founding	principles	as	espoused	in	the	Reconstruction	and	Development	Plan.198	As	Kenyan	investor	Ory	Okolloh	notes,	the	continent	cannot,	“entrepreneur	itself	out	of	its	basic	problems”.199		The	private	sector200	was	not	democratically	elected	to	govern	South	Africa	and	ensure	that	citizens’	basic	needs	are	met,	but	the	national	government	was.	Circumventing	that	duty	and	instead	aligning	national	policy	to	externally	developed	economic	principles	imposed	and	co-opted	by	a	transnational	elite	is	unacceptable	and	will	certainly	perpetuate	the	subjugation	of	the	poor.201	Regardless	of	the	innovation	with	which	SME	entrepreneurs	leverage	their	bottom-up,	highly	tailored	business	models,	their	role	within	neoliberal	development	remains	paradoxical	and	outside	of	the	scope	of	democratic	accountability,	202		thereby	limiting	their	legitimacy.				
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